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The COVID-19 pandemic has put the public finances of industrial countries under severe stress. The 
resulting recession has not only led to shortfalls in tax revenues but also to increased public 
expenditures. National governments have embarked on massive rescue packages to protect citizens 
and companies against the potentially disastrous health, social and economic consequences of 
pandemic disruptions. In addition, EU Member States have designed stimulus packages in order to 
support the economic recovery of affected sectors. For the euro area, the deep economic contraction 
and the soaring public debt levels have recalled bad memories from the years of the global financial 
crisis and the subsequent euro area debt crisis. The concern has been that this new and substantial 
solvency shock could once again trigger a vicious and self-enforcing cycle of rising sovereign bond 
spreads, a destabilization of the financial sector and a further decline in real economic activity. 
Subsequently, this could all lead to a new sovereign liquidity crisis similar to the contagion following 
the Greek government-debt crisis in spring 2010. 
The mechanisms that can push even solvent countries into a bad equilibrium with an acute 
illiquidity have been extensively researched (De Grauwe 2012; De Grauwe and Ji 2013; Lorenzoni and 
Werning 2019). Two risk factors crucially determine the probability of a debt crisis: first, the 
fundamental fiscal health of countries that are hit by a sudden solvency shock; and second, the 
existence and credibility of crisis mechanisms that can serve as lenders of last resort. Both risk factors 
still make the euro area particularly vulnerable and prone to new crises of confidence. Already before 
the pandemic hit, several euro countries continued to show weak fiscal fundamentals and a lack of 
sustainable budgetary trajectories. The European Commission had classified five euro area countries 
(Belgium, Spain, France, Italy, Portugal) as “high risk” cases for a lack of public debt sustainability over 
the medium term in its Debt Sustainability Monitor, published on the eve of the pandemic in January 
2020 (European Commission 2020a). Consequently, exactly those countries that have particularly 
suffered from the pandemic shock in 2020, already faced severe fiscal sustainability challenges before. 
On the risk factor of a missing lender of last resort, the euro area debt crisis has seen the establishment 
of new fiscal and monetary liquidity facilities that can have a stabilizing function in an unfolding 
liquidity crisis. The European Stability Mechanism (ESM) has successfully stabilized even a high-debt 
country such as Greece. The ECB had set up its Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) program to 
back-up the ESM liquidity support in cases of emergency. While these liquidity mechanisms were 
already in place when the coronavirus arrived in Europe, their effectiveness and credibility was 
arguably limited. The ESM not only suffered from its constrained lending capacity but also its principle 
of conditionality which has made it a politically controversial instrument, as potential borrowers are 
afraid of losing their national policy autonomy once they make use of it. Since the OMT program is 
conditional on ESM support, any rejection of ESM emergency liquidity also leaves the OMT 
inaccessible. 
Although the euro sovereign bond markets were thus clearly vulnerable at the start of the COVID-
19 crisis, no serious escalation has occurred so far. Risk spreads of the higher indebted euro countries 






development happened similar to the crisis one decade ago. Sovereign spreads already peaked in 
March and were more or less stable over the course of the year 2020.  
 
Figure 1: Government bond spreads of ten euro area countries in the crisis year 2020 
 
Notes: The figure shows daily government bond spreads of ten euro area countries with the German yield curve 
functioning as a baseline. The data is fitted as a third-order polynomial yield curve of government bonds with a 
maturity of ten years. For more information see Section 3.2. Data source: Datastream. 
 
It is our objective to assess the relative importance of European fiscal and monetary crisis support 
for this remarkable stability in euro area sovereign bond markets. The year 2020 has seen a swift and 
massive reaction of fiscal and monetary policy at the European level. Already in March 2020, the ECB 
Council established another securities purchase program, the Pandemic Emergency Purchase Program 
(PEPP), which contained important changes regarding the rules of sovereign purchases compared to 
its predecessor the Public Sector Purchase Program (PSPP). Furthermore, European fiscal players also 
reacted to these changes and modified pre-existing fiscal tools (new credit lines both at the ESM and 
the European Investment Bank). Moreover, there has been a series of institutional innovations. First, 
the SURE loan program (temporary Support to mitigate Unemployment Risks in an Emergency) was 
established. It provides liquidity to EU Member States to fund short-time working schemes and is 
refinanced from EU borrowing. Second, and more substantial, EU leaders agreed on the fully debt-
financed ‘Next Generation EU’ package, mobilizing 750 billion euros (at 2018 prices) from the EU 






So far, these consolidated fiscal and monetary efforts have been successful in protecting the euro 
area sovereign bond markets against a new debt crisis. However, it is unclear which player is the crucial 
one; the ECB with its PSPP/PEPP support or the EU fiscal level with Next Generation EU and the other 
newly activated fiscal instruments. Observers conjecture that the stabilization of risk spreads in the 
pandemic is not only a consequence of the PEPP support but also reflects the new EU fiscal support 
(Gros 2021). However, as yet any substantive evidence on the relative importance of monetary and 
fiscal measures since the outbreak of the pandemic is missing. Our event-based study focuses precisely 
on this question. Thus, we add an important new aspect to the developed literature on the effects of 
unconventional monetary policy on spreads (surveyed in the next section). 
Any evidence to which extent the new fiscal tools already have a measurable impact on spreads 
is of substantial monetary policy relevance as it may help to assess potential risks for the effective 
independence of the ECB in the future. If the containment of risk premiums for euro area countries 
crucially hinges on ECB support, this points to the risk of fiscal dominance (Bordo and Levy 2020). In a 
regime of fiscal dominance, the ECB is effectively forced to continuously finance euro area countries 
even if they are close to (or even already in) insolvency in order to prevent a new debt and financial 
crisis. If, however, the new fiscal instruments already play a decisive stabilizing role, this would signal 
relief for the ECB from the fiscal players. To the extent that the compression of risk spreads in 2020 
already reflects the recent European fiscal innovations, this indicates a development towards a 
European Fiscal Union in which the protection against liquidity crises is effectively achieved through 
fiscal instruments. Any such development would help the ECB to take its monetary policy decisions 
with less consideration of solvency and liquidity challenges in the high-debt euro countries. 
Our analytical design addresses the question on the relative importance of fiscal and monetary 
policy for euro area government bond spreads through an event-analytical study. We identify 
important announcements with a focus on the pandemic crisis measures and study their effects on the 
sovereign risk spreads in the euro area. We find that the ECB’s PEPP had the largest impact on 
sovereign spreads and was most successful in establishing more homogeneous financing conditions 
among the considered euro area countries. The combination of EU level fiscal packages had no 
measurable spread-reducing effect with the exception of the Next Generation EU program, which also 
reduced the spreads but to a smaller extent than the PEPP. Finally, a temporary relaxation of European 
fiscal rules through the activation of the emergency-escape clause under the Stability and Growth Pact 
is associated with rising spreads.  
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 summarizes the related literature and theoretical 
considerations. In Section 3, we derive our hypotheses, introduce the data and outline the empirical 
strategy. The empirical results are discussed in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
2 Literature review 
The impact of ECB asset purchases and other unconventional central bank measures on sovereign 
yields and spreads has been studied within an ever-expanding literature.1 Box 1 in the Appendix 
                                                          







describes these unconventional programs with more details. The first government bond purchase 
program introduced by the ECB was the Securities Markets Program (SMP) in 2010 following the onset 
of the sovereign debt crisis in several euro countries. The ECB claimed that this program was necessary 
to restore the appropriate functioning of the monetary policy transmission channel and “to ensure 
depth and liquidity in malfunctioning segments of the debt securities markets” (ECB 2010a, p.24). It 
subsequently came to an end in September 2012. Eser and Schwaab (2016) analyze this program for 
the countries Ireland, Italy, Greece, Portugal, and Spain between 2010 and 2011, and find a decrease 
in the yields of about three basis points for purchases of one per mille of outstanding debt. Likewise, 
Ghysels et al. (2017) find that the SMP was successful in reducing government bond yields temporarily 
by using data from short 15-minute intervals. Furthermore, De Pooter et al. (2018) estimate that in the 
long term, purchases of one percent of sovereign debt decrease the liquidity premium (i.e., the 
liquidity component of the yield spread) by 13 to 17 basis points. 
The next purchase program that was announced by the ECB in 2012, but was never activated, is 
the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) program which replaced the SMP. Altavilla et al. (2016) 
study the announcement of this program and show that the mere announcement of this policy 
measure reduced Italian and Spanish sovereign bond rates by 200 basis points, while there was no 
effect on German and French bond rates. They also test for other macroeconomic effects of the 
announcement of OMTs and find effects on credit and economic growth in Italy and Spain, but again 
no effect for Germany and France.  
Szczerbowicz (2015), Fratzscher et al. (2016), and Ambler and Rumler (2019) employ event studies 
to evaluate several unconventional monetary policy announcements, among others the SMP and OMT. 
Szczerbowicz (2015) and Fratzscher et al. (2016) confirm that the programs were most effective for 
fiscally weaker periphery countries. Moreover, Fratzscher et al. (2016) also analyze the effects of these 
programs on equity prices and exchange rates and find that both the SMP and OMT as well as LTROs 
increased equity prices, while the estimated effect of the programs points in the opposite direction for 
the euro nominal effective exchange rate (euro appreciation for OMT, depreciation for SMP). Ambler 
and Rumler (2019) conclude that the SMP and OMT announcements had the strongest negative effect 
on sovereign bond yields and a positive effect on expected inflation among the unconventional 
monetary policy announcements between July 2008 and March 2016. Fendel and Neugebauer (2020) 
analyze unconventional monetary policy announcements between 2007 and 2017. They differentiate 
countries according to their solvency and find that less solvent countries experience stronger sovereign 
bond yield reductions than solvent countries following announcements of non-standard monetary 
policies. 
In addition to the purchase programs, Szczerbowicz (2015) also investigates exceptional liquidity 
provisions such as the three-year LTROs and cutting the ECB deposit rate to zero. These measures 
successfully reduced the tensions on the money market. Finally, Szczerbowicz (2015) looks at two 
covered bond purchase programs (CBPP1 and CBPP2). An interesting result is that the covered bond 
purchase programs decreased sovereign bond spreads, although purchases of sovereign bonds also 
decreased covered bond spreads. 
Several studies have investigated the APP and in particular the PSPP. Urbschat and Watzka (2020) 
estimate the effect of APP program announcements between 2014 and 2016 on government bond 






decreasing effects for further announcements. Altavilla et al. (2015) confirm the yield-reducing effect 
with a similar event study. The effect amounts to a decrease of 30 to 50 basis points at ten-year 
maturity due to an announcement, and even double this size for high-yield countries like Spain and 
Italy. The authors also find significant spillover effects to other types of assets not targeted by the APP. 
De Santis (2020) also confirms the result of a big announcement effect on government bond yields by 
taking into account the discussion intensity of the announcement in the media. Moreover, Bulligan 
and Delle Monache (2018) explicitly study different time periods to compare the size of the effects and 
again find the strongest effect on government bonds in the initial phase of the APP. They also find that 
the APP announcement led to a depreciation of the euro exchange rate against the British pound 
sterling and the US dollar. In the most recent period of their study, October 2016 to July 2017, inflation 
expectations appeared to have risen due to the APP. By using a VAR model, Gambetti and Musso (2017) 
estimate that the APP had positive effects on GDP and HICP inflation in the first two years of the 
program. Breckenfelder et al. (2016) once again confirm that the announcement of the APP reduced 
sovereign yields.  
A first paper studying the effects of the PEPP on government bond yields is Hartley and Rebucci 
(2020). However, as they evaluate purchase programs from several central banks around the world, 
they only analyze German sovereign bond yields in the context of the PEPP and find a decrease of 15 
basis points over a three-day window following the announcement of the program. 
Summing up, there is comprehensive evidence that the ECB asset purchasing programs have been 
effective in lowering both sovereign bond yields and spreads, and the first existing study confirms this 
effect also for the PEPP. 
Our study contributes to the literature from a different and new perspective. Our focus is on the 
relative role of fiscal and monetary policy announcements for government bond spreads in the context 
of the COVID-19 crisis. The literature that looks at fiscal policy announcements on euro sovereign 
spreads is very limited. Afonso et al. (2020) study the effect of macroeconomic, monetary and fiscal 
policy announcements on government bond spreads of ten euro area countries. They analyze the 
announcements of the excessive deficit procedure (EDP) and find that spreads increase if a country is 
put under the EDP. Likewise, releases of the European Commission of higher debt increases spreads, 
whereas better budget balance forecasts lead to lower spreads. Afonso and Strauch (2007) 
concentrate on fiscal policy events taking place in 2002. They find significant effects for a few events 
of EDP announcements. They conclude that the European fiscal policy framework can have a 
decreasing effect on spreads through its credibility in the ability to detain excessive deficits, but also 
an increasing effect on spreads through the increased information availability via the surveillance. 
Another study that investigates the effect of EDPs on sovereign bond spreads is Kalan et al. (2018) who 
conclude that sovereign spreads are higher when countries are placed under an EDP. The authors 
interpret this as an information signal. Other papers study the effect of fiscal rules on sovereign risk 
premia with the result that credible and well-designed fiscal rules can decrease risk premia (see Eyraud 
et al. 2018 for an overview). 
However, it is important to note that all these studies with their focus on fiscal surveillance and 
decisions in the context of the Stability and Growth Pact do not cover the potential impact of new 
European fiscal support instruments which is our key interest. Box 2 in the Appendix summarizes the 






(2020) who analyze the relative importance of pandemic-related indicators and both monetary and 
fiscal policy responses in the first half of 2020. Using a synthetic control group design, they find that 
COVID-19 mortality rates had a significant spread-increasing effect for credit default swaps (CDS) which 
cannot be explained by the fundamentals driving these spreads in normal times. The authors show 
that national stimulus packages and the resulting indebtedness contributed to a widening of CDS 
spreads, although the ECB’s PEPP announcement in March stopped the widening. They account for EU 
fiscal announcements through a non-differentiated dummy variable, which is shown to be statistically 
insignificant. Compared to this study, we apply a finer-grained event-analytical design to appropriately 
assess the variance of various new European fiscal instruments set up in the pandemic. Moreover, we 
extend their sample period to also include, e.g., the political agreement on Next Generation EU and 
focus on spreads of bond yields rather than CDS spreads to also capture the liquidity component in 
bond yields relative to the benchmark. 
This existing literature puts forward several potential mechanisms through which central banks’ 
asset purchase programs could affect sovereign bond yields. A possible first channel views monetary 
interventions as a signal that a central bank judges yields too high and wants to correct this 
misalignment in market evaluations through asset purchases. If this improves market expectations, 
this would result in lower default risk premia. This channel can be also described as a channel of 
confidence in the overall performance of an economy (Ghysels et al. 2017; Fratzscher et al. 2016). 
Regarding the liquidity aspect of sovereign bonds, a key channel that is often found to lower the 
liquidity risk premium for sovereign bonds is based on central banks’ role as an investor of last resort. 
The entrance of a large new buyer on the bond market makes a counterparty easier to find and 
therefore reduces liquidity risk premia (Eser and Schwaab 2016; Ghysels et al. 2017).  
A mechanism that goes beyond default or liquidity risks is the portfolio rebalancing channel. 
According to Gambetti and Musso (2017, p.7), central bank asset purchases “will lead sellers of those 
assets to rebalance their portfolio towards other assets’’. As a consequence of this rebalancing, the 
prices of these other assets increase as well, thereby stimulating economic activity and raising inflation 
expectations. Next, there is the credit channel that describes how asset purchases lead to higher 
reserves at central banks for commercial banks, so that these banks can provide more loans to firms 
and households (Fendel and Neugebauer 2020; Altavilla et al. 2015). Finally, the signaling channel, 
which is not easily separable from the portfolio rebalancing channel, implies lower expected monetary 
policy rates in the future, which instantaneously decreases long-term yields (Bauer and Rudebusch 
2014; Eser and Schwaab 2016). 
As for the impact of EU fiscal instruments on sovereign yields, the channels affecting the default 
risk premia and those influencing the overall market confidence in the economy that benefits from 
fiscal support are expected to be of major importance. We do not expect a direct liquidity effect of the 
fiscal interventions since unlike central bank programs, the fiscal tools do not include secondary 
market purchases of sovereign bonds. As our interest lies in the comparison of the total monetary vs. 
fiscal policy impact on spreads, the empirical analysis does not separately consider single mechanisms 






3 Empirical analysis 
3.1 Study design and hypotheses 
We apply an event-analytical design to identify the relative role of monetary and fiscal policy decisions 
to contain euro area sovereign spreads. Our key interest is the crisis response of the ECB and EU in the 
pandemic. However, we include a longer time period, going back in some specifications as far as 
November 2014, in order to validate our approach and compare the results with established findings 
from the literature. 
We have clear hypotheses and sign predictions for most of the monetary and fiscal events. In line 
with the overwhelming evidence of the literature, we expect that the monetary policy announcements 
on both conventional and unconventional expansions will compress spreads. We also expect that the 
spread compressing effect should be more pronounced for the fiscally weaker countries for which the 
support is more crucial to guarantee their liquidity. For the monetary purchase programs, we expect a 
stronger effect from the PEPP compared to the PSPP as the ECB has explicitly relaxed the commitment 
to the ECB capital key (and other constraints such as minimum credit rating or issue and issuer limits) 
for the former (see Box 1 in the Appendix). Similarly, if European fiscal liquidity support and transfers 
have an effect, this should lead in the same direction and lower spreads as it improves the liquidity 
and – in the case of transfers – even the solvency of beneficiary countries. We expect a stronger effect 
for a program that includes actual transfers (as it is the case for Next Generation EU, see Box 2 in the 
Appendix) compared to pure loan programs (e.g., the SURE program) whose support is limited to 
liquidity assistance and a possible slight advantage from preferential interest rates. 
We do not have a clear sign expectation for the relaxation of EU fiscal rules as there are 
counteracting possible effects. On the one hand, markets may welcome the relaxation as a growth-
supporting move that enables EU Member States to embark on a more effective counter-cyclical fiscal 
policy that will alleviate and shorten the recession. In this case, the relaxation could lower spreads. On 
the other hand, investors may take the relaxation as a signal for a less sustainable fiscal trajectory. This 
negative credibility effect could then increase spreads in line with the empirical findings that weaker 
fiscal rules tend to damage fiscal credibility and to increase sovereign spreads (Feld et al. 2017; 
Heinemann et al. 2014; Iara and Wolff 2014). 
In our definitions of “events”, we evaluate the announcement rather than the actual 
implementation through asset purchases or fiscal disbursements. According to economic theory, we 
should expect the market reactions to occur immediately after the announcement of the total 
intended purchases (“stock effect”) due to updated expectations among trading agents, and not of the 
subsequent implementation over time (“flow effect”), which does not provide any additional news. In 
line with this argumentation, contributions from the literature identified the announcement effects of 
ECB purchase programs to be responsible for the largest share of the overall program impact (Altavilla 
et al. 2015; Urbschat and Watzka 2020). Moreover, for the pandemic-related fiscal instruments there 
are very long time lags between the first announcements and the actual flow of resources. For 
example, the European Commission announced at the end of May 2020 its intention to set up the Next 







3.2 Data on government bond spreads and policy events 
This paper employs daily data on government bond yields for eleven Euro area countries (Austria, 
Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain). The data 
captures end-of-day-courses for all working days. It is fitted as a third-order polynomial yield curve of 
government bonds with a maturity of ten years. The largest data sample that we employ for our 
analysis ranges from November 2014 to October 2020.2 As the major aim of the paper is to track 
changes in sovereign spreads, we transform the yield data into spreads, using the German data series 
as a benchmark. We thus calculate the government bond spreads for each country by subtracting the 
German bond yield. This leaves us with a sample of ten countries. The composition of these countries 
is driven by the availability of data. 
For the identification of events, we employ two main sources. Each source provides event dates 
on either monetary policy announcements or fiscal policy announcements. First, we scanned all ECB 
press releases3 concerning monetary policy decisions from 2015 onwards to identify adjustments to 
the key interest rates and announcements of non-standard policy measures. Included programs are 
the PEPP and PSPP as part of the APP as well as the various longer-term refinancing operations (LTRO, 
TLTRO, PELTRO). Most of the relevant policy changes are announced through the press releases and 
the press conferences following the regular monetary policy meetings of the ECB Governing Council. 
Extraordinary and urgent measures, such as the introduction of the PEPP, are usually published in 
additional press releases. Second, for comparing effects of monetary policy decisions to fiscal policy 
decisions, we handpicked announcements of measures to fight the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic 
taken by the EU. A timeline of EU actions was published by the European Commission on their website 
and serves as the second main source for events.4 From this list, we selected all announcements 
concerning the implementation of innovative fiscal instruments and new joint debt instruments. 
A potential concern regarding these fiscal policy announcements might be that they contain only 
little new information to market participants as the negotiations before such important EU-level 
decisions are usually well covered in the media. In contrast, monetary policy decisions are not the 
result of a political debate and are decided upon behind closed doors. Whereas we can assume (in line 
with the extensive event-analytical literature on monetary policy announcements) that ECB monetary 
policy announcements entail news to the market, the publication of fiscal policy decisions might trigger 
only minor market reactions if some of the communicated information could already be factored-in 
before the announcement. We are confident this should not be a major issue in our context of the far-
reaching European fiscal decisions in the pandemic. 
First, a closer scrutiny of the EU’s pandemic fiscal decisions indicates that events such as the 
publication of the French-German proposal or the Next Generation EU proposal indeed contained 
significant news. Figure 2 shows the trend in google searches for terms related to the Next Generation 
EU program (as the most important fiscal program at the EU level to fight the economic consequences 
of the pandemic). Whereas it is natural to observe few searches for terms associated with this program 
                                                          
2 Data on bond yields is taken from Datastream and is available from 1996 onwards (see https://www.refi 
nitiv.com/en/products/datastream-macroeconomic-analysis). We restrict the sample period because of our 
selection of events, the first event being observed in 2015. 
3 ECB press releases: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/activities/mopo/html/index.en.html. 






before it was proposed by the European Commission on May 27, 2020 (i.e., when this terminology was 
first introduced), this argument does not hold for the final announcement of the program. The peak in 
online searches after the political agreement on July 21, 2020, suggests that this announcement 
offered new information that was not available before the press release. 
 
Figure 2: Trend index for Google searches during the weeks around the Next Generation EU 
announcements 
 
Notes: Worldwide trend in Google searches for the terms ‘Next Generation EU’, ‘NGEU’, ‘French-German 
proposal’, ‘Wiederaufbauplan’, and ‘Fonds de Relance’ to capture the commonly employed terminology used to 
describe the policy proposals. Source: Google Trends. 
 
Second, we scanned various national and international newspaper articles which suggest that the 
announcements represented real news and that the political discussions were considered anything but 
foreseeable.5 In fact, the news surrounding the final summit from July 17 to July 21 suggest that not 
only the content of the proposal and the size of the budget were still extensively discussed but also 
that the summit’s success was uncertain until the very end. It was only in the evening of the day before 
the official announcement when crucial breakthroughs regarding the new joint debt instrument and 
the rule of law conditionality were achieved. 6  First press reports on the confirmation of these 
breakthroughs were published after 6pm. As our daily yield data represents the trading courses until 
6pm for each day, the yields for this day should be unaffected by these news and only the yield data 
for the following day (i.e.,  the day of the official announcement of Next Generation EU) should capture 
the news on the success of the summit.7 In combination, these arguments and pieces of evidence leave 
                                                          
5 On the French-German proposal and the European Commission proposal, see, e.g., The Guardian (26/05/2020, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/may/26/franco-german-plan-for-european-recovery-will-face-com 
promises), politico (27/05/2020, https://www.politico.eu/article/kurz-cautious-on-commissions-750b-recovery-
blueprint-coronavirus-covid19-mff-budget/), politico (28/05/2020, https://www.politico.eu/article/recovery-
fund-everything-depends-on-what-happens-next/). 
6  On the final summit, see, e.g., BR24 (20/07/2020, https://www.br.de/nachrichten/deutschland-welt/eu-
sondergipfel-kommt-nun-doch-der-kompromiss,S5Hytj1), Manager Magazin (21/07/2020, https://www.mana 
ger-magazin.de/politik/coronavirus-eu-einigt-sich-auf-historisches-corona-paket-a-5b771ac9-1f68-4708-89a4-
4a05b457b19f), New York Times (20/07/2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/20/world/europe/eu-stimu 
lus-coronavirus.html), BR24 (21/07/2020, https://www.br.de/nachrichten/ deutschland-welt/corona-hilfen-eu-
sondergipfel-erringt-etappensieg,S5JIVVX), Der Standard (21/07/2020, https://www.derstandard.de/story/200 
0118877971/eu-ratspraesident-michel-verkuendet-einigung-auf-1-8-billionen-euro). 
7 In addition to these considerations, it can be argued that also the monetary policy decisions in the unfolding 
pandemic were preceded by public debates and statements of European central bankers. Hence, the actual 






us confident that the EU fiscal policy announcements did not include less news to the market than ECB 
press releases so that a comparative event analysis is warranted. 
As we are interested in the average effect of different types of monetary and fiscal interventions, 
we combine all announcements for one type of instrument into one dummy.8 To clarify this approach, 
we consider the PEPP. As shown in Table 1, there were two announcements regarding this ECB 
program, first at its implementation (March 18, 2020) and second on the increase of its envelope (June 
4, 2020). Instead of including two separate dummies for these two event dates, we use one single 
dummy named “PEPP expansion’’, which is equal to 1 on these two dates and 0 otherwise. By doing 
so, we identify an overall number of five monetary policy event dummies as shown in Table 1. These 
capture twelve event dates on which one or more policy announcements were made. In addition, we 
include two fiscal policy event dummies, capturing eight announcements. The two distinct fiscal 
dummies refer to the crisis-related relaxation of EU fiscal rules and the establishment of new European 
financial instruments that provide financial resources to Member States. We follow Fendel and 
Neugebauer (2020) and do not weigh the events such that each event is considered equally relevant. 
 
3.3 Identification and estimation 
To estimate the effects of the EU monetary and fiscal policy announcements on government bond 
spreads of selected EU countries we first employ a panel regression. As our main specification, we 
estimate the following event-based model: 
𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽3𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥_𝑠𝑠𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝐸𝐸𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽4𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑑𝑑 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 , (1) 
where 𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the government bond spread in country i on day t with 𝑖𝑖 = 1, … ,10 (ten countries relative 
to Germany) and 𝐸𝐸 = 1, … , 2189 (with November 3, 2014 being the first and October 30, 2020 being 
the last trading day in the longest sample). Our main variable of interest is 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 which denotes all 
events of a certain event group as a dummy. Figure 1 in the introduction plots the country-specific 
spreads and suggests that the data is non-stationary. A unit root test for panel data, proposed by Levin 
et al. (2002), confirms this speculation. We therefore use first differences of the data (denoted by 𝛥𝛥). 
To control for other factors affecting government bond spreads, we include three commonly employed 
control variables. First, as yield changes are likely to depend on previous changes, we include the 
government bond spread with a lag of one day (Urbschat and Watzka 2020). Second, the corporate 
bond spread is included to capture general risk sensitivity in the euro area. We follow Eser and 
Schwaab (2016) and define the corporate bond spread as the difference between BBB and AAA rated 
corporate bond yields to maturity of bonds with a maturity of ten and more years, covering the whole 
euro area. Third, to control for macroeconomic surprises other than announcements of monetary or 
fiscal policy measures, we make use of the Citigroup Economic Surprise Index (CESI) (Fendel and 
Neugebauer 2020). The CESI index is calculated on a daily basis as a rolling average over the last three 
                                                          
by financial media. Therefore, it is difficult to argue that monetary policy decisions in the crisis were in principle 
less predictable than fiscal policy decisions. 
8 The alternative would be to include dummies for every single event rather than grouping the announcements 
by policy program. We make use of a similar approach in a small excursion when analyzing the changing effects 





















03.12.2015 Decrease of the interest rate on the deposit facility by 10 basis points to -0.30% 
10.03.2016 
Decrease of the interest rate on the main refinancing operations by 5 basis points 
to 0.00%, of the interest rate on the marginal lending facility by 5 basis points to 
0.25% and of the interest rate on the deposit facility by 10 basis points to -0.40% 
12.09.2019 Decrease of the interest rate on the deposit facility by 10 basis points to -0.50% 
(T)LTRO 
22.01.2015 
Change in pricing of targeted longer-term refinancing operations, in the way that 
the interest rate applicable to future TLTRO operations is equal to the rate on the 
Eurosystem’s main refinancing operations: Removal of the 10 basis point spread 
over the MRO rate that applied to the first two TLTROs 
10.03.2016 Launch of new series of four longer-term refinancing operations 
07.03.2019 Launch of new series of quarterly longer-term refinancing operations 
12.03.2020 
Application of more favorable terms in TLTRO III to support bank lending to small 
and medium sized enterprises which are affected most by the Covid-19 pandemic 
and conduction of additional longer-term refinancing operations 
30.04.2020 Launch of new series of seven pandemic longer-term refinancing operations (PELTRO) 
PSPP 
expansion 
22.01.2015 Introduction of PSPP 
03.12.2015 Extension of APP until March 2017 and inclusion of further debt instruments issued by regional and local governments in the list of eligible assets 
10.03.2016 Expansion of APP to €80 billion monthly 
12.09.2019 Restart of APP at a monthly pace of €20 billion 
12.03.2020 Addition of a temporary envelope of net asset purchases in the amount of €120 billion until the end of the year 
PEPP 
expansion 
18.03.2020 Launch of PEPP with an envelope of €750 billion 
04.06.2020 Expansion of PEPP by €600 billion 
PSPP 
reduction 
08.12.2016 Decrease of PSPP purchases to €60 billion monthly and decrease of the minimum remaining maturity for eligible securities in PSPP from two years to one year 
26.10.2017 Decrease of PSPP purchases to €30 billion monthly  











13.03.2020 European Commission makes first announcement that it considers the activation of the SGP escape clause 




13.03.2020 Mobilization of EU budget flexibility to increase cohesion spending 
01.04.2020 Proposal of SURE (Support to mitigate Unemployment Risks in an Emergency) 
09.04.2020 Agreement by EU finance ministers on 540 billion package including SURE, EIB and ESM 
18.05.2020 French-German proposal that paved the way towards Next Generation 
27.05.2020 European Commission Proposal of Next Generation EU with various surprises compared to German-French model 
21.07.2020 Political agreement on Next Generation EU in the European Council 
 
months and captures unexpected changes in a series of economic indicators.9 Summary statistics are 
reported in Table A1 in the Appendix. 
                                                          
9 More precisely, the index is calculated as the difference between the released economic indicators and the 
respective Bloomberg survey median (to capture market expectations). The individual economic indicators (e.g., 






Finally, we include country fixed effects (𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖) to control for unobserved country characteristics. In 
our baseline specification we also include working-day fixed effects (𝛼𝛼𝑑𝑑) to allow for a possible weekly 
pattern in trading activities and price movements (Szczerbowicz 2015). To capture general time trends 
in the spreads, we also run robustness checks with working-day times year fixed effects. However, as 
these robustness checks in Section 4.2 show, the choice of the time fixed effects structure has very 
little impact on the coefficient estimates. Moreover, to specify a meaningful comparison period, we 
restrict the sample period in a way that the sample starts two months before the first event in each 
event group. Hence, the sample for the monetary policy events starts on 01/11/2014 as the first 
announcement is observed for 22/01/2015.10 The fiscal policy events took place much later in 2020. 
Their sample starts in December 2019. Further robustness checks in Section 4.2 show how differences 
in the definition of the sample period affect the conclusion regarding the announcement impacts of 
some event types. This concerns in particular the interest rate decreases, (T)LTROs, and PSPP 
expansions. Their impact changes over the years and the results speak for an equalizing effect on 
sovereign spreads only in the earlier years of the ECB programs. In all regressions, we use robust 
standard errors. 
In a second step, we estimate the effects for every single country using the following model: 
 
𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽3𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽4𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥_𝑠𝑠𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝐸𝐸𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼𝑑𝑑 + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡 . (2) 
An augmented Dickey-Fuller test suggests that the country-specific data is non-stationary such 
that we again use first differences. The separate regressions for each country include the same control 
variables as our panel regression except the country fixed effects. Summary statistics for the variables 
are provided in Table A1 in the Appendix. 
4 Results 
4.1 Baseline panel regressions 
In this section, we discuss our main results. Moreover, we present three types of robustness checks 
and two types of extensions to the analysis to develop a better understanding of the drivers behind 
the findings. Table 2 shows the main results from the panel model in Equation (1). We discuss the 
results separately for each event group (i.e., monetary policies and fiscal policies). 
 
Monetary policy events   For the conventional monetary policy instruments in the first two columns 
of the table, we find rather small and statistically insignificant announcement effects on government 
spreads of the selected group of EU countries. Contrary to expectations, the announcements of longer-
term refinancing operations even tend to have a positive effect on the sovereign spreads. The results 
regarding the non-standard monetary policies in columns (3) to (6) are more in line with expectations. 
                                                          
fiscal balance) are weighted using their announcement impact on exchange rates in the past. In addition, data 
points from the more distant past receive smaller weights. The mechanics of the index are such that a value 
above (below) zero marks a more positive (negative) realization of the economic indicators, relative to consensus 
expectations (Maveé et al. 2016). 
10 An exception is the monetary policy program PEPP, which was announced only in 2020. The baseline results 






Here, we further categorize the events and differentiate between expansionary and restrictive 
monetary policy announcements. As shown in column (3) of Table 2, announcements to expand the 
ECB’s purchase programs tend to have a negative effect on government spreads. However, this effect 
is solely driven by the new PEPP, for which we estimate an effect with high statistical significance. The 
announcement of a PEPP expansion correlates with an average reduction of government bond spreads 
by 6.6 basis points. The effect appears to be small but it represents an average effect across all 
countries including those with a top credit rating. We turn to the country-specific effects below. The 
PSPP also appears to affect sovereign yields with the expected sign, at least when reductions in 
purchase volumes are taken into consideration, as shown in column (6). The result that the PEPP’s 
yield-compressing effect is more pronounced than for the PSPP is equally in line with our expectations. 
The PEPP as the less constrained program can provide a more targeted support to specific countries 
with weak fiscal fundamentals and is thus more effective to decrease spreads. 
 
Fiscal policy events   Turning to the fiscal policy announcements, the estimated coefficients for the 
two event dummies that capture the relaxation of EU fiscal rules and the various EU fiscal packages to 
fight the economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic exhibit different signs. As expected, the 
announcements of fiscal support measures correlate with a reduction in sovereign spreads even 
though this effect is rather small and statistically insignificant for the combination of all announced 
fiscal crisis measures (encompassing the various measures like EIB, SURE, and Next Generation EU 
support). As explained above (3.1) we would expect a particularly strong effect from Next Generation 
EU as this is not only the largest but also the only fiscal tool that includes a significant transfer 
component. For this reason, we separately estimate the announcement effect for Next Generation EU. 
These results in column (8) of Table 2 show that the Next Generation effect, in contrast to the 
insignificant combined fiscal events, is measured with statistical precision. Events such as the 
Commission Proposal or the European Council agreement on Next Generation EU, on average, reduce 
the spreads by 2.7 basis points. Importantly, even this effect does not at all reach the magnitude of 
the PEPP announcement effect. The Next Generation EU effect is less than half as large as the PEPP 
effect. Turning to our second type of fiscal events that cover relaxations of EU fiscal rules we find a 
spread increasing effect, albeit with marginal significance. Hence, our results do not provide any 
evidence that the activation of the Stability Pact’s escape clause is seen as a positive message for the 
growth perspective and fiscal outlook of high-debt countries. Rather, we find weak evidence that the 
activation of the escape clause is taken as unfavorable news for these countries’ fiscal reputation. 
 
Overall, we observe statistically significant coefficient estimates for the PEPP and much smaller 
but also statistically significant effects for Next Generation EU. In contrast the relaxation of EU fiscal 
rules as a measure to influence government bond spreads is less clear, coefficient estimates are 
calculated with less statistical precision, and results rather point to a negative reputation effect. We 
find no evidence for a spread-reducing effect of the more established monetary policy programs and 







Table 2: Panel regressions 
  Dependent variable: government bond spread 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)   (7) (8) (9) 




PSPP and PEPP  EU fiscal corona packages Relaxation 
of EU 













Event -0.0066 0.0150 -0.0112 0.0133 -0.0657*** 0.0212**  -0.0066 -0.0266*** 0.0315* 
 (0.0130) (0.0155) (0.0145) (0.0183) (0.0164) (0.0089)  (0.0076) (0.0087) (0.0171) 
           
Lagged government bond spread 0.0598 0.0599 0.0579 0.0599 -0.0014 0.0598  -0.0114 -0.0141 -0.0055 
 (0.0587) (0.0587) (0.0587) (0.0587) (0.0641) (0.0587)  (0.0620) (0.0616) (0.0622) 
Economic surprise index (CESI) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Corporate bond spread 0.5711*** 0.5742*** 0.5711*** 0.5750*** 0.5147*** 0.5730***  0.5122*** 0.5069*** 0.5055*** 
 (0.0758) (0.0752) (0.0753) (0.0755) (0.1069) (0.0751)  (0.1095) (0.1089) (0.1088) 
Constant -0.0006 -0.0007 -0.0006 -0.0007 -0.0005 -0.0007  -0.0010 -0.0009 -0.0015 
  (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0012) (0.0007)   (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) 
Observations 15,650 15,650 15,650 15,650 2,180 15,650  2,400 2,400 2,400 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0193 0.0194 0.0193 0.0193 0.0378 0.0194  0.0285 0.0306 0.0304 
Country fixed effects           
Working-day fixed effects           
Notes: OLS regressions. Results correspond to Equation (1). The dependent variable captures the government bond spread of ten euro area countries with the German 







4.2 Robustness checks 
To test the sensitivity of the main results in Table 2, we present three types of robustness checks. 
Figure 3 visualizes the effects in a graph to support an easy-to-grasp impression regarding the relative 
size of the program-specific announcement impacts. The largest effects are found for announcements 
regarding the PEPP and EU fiscal rules. Whereas the negative impact of a PEPP expansion on 
government bond spreads is statistically highly significant, the positive announcement effect of 
relaxing EU fiscal rules is measured with less statistical precision. Methodology-wise, Figure 3 also 
shows the effect of running alternative model specifications with respect to the included time fixed 
effects. Whereas the baseline specification only controls for working-day effects, the first alternative 
specification includes working-day times year fixed effects. With a long time period and the natural 
trends in sovereign spreads which are unrelated to the events, the model might mistakenly pick up 
such trends as an event effect. This is precluded when using an interaction with year dummies. The 
third specification abstains from including time fixed effects altogether. 
 
 Figure 3: Alternative time fixed effects structures for the estimation models 
 
Notes: Coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals for each event type. Results correspond to Equation 
(1) (baseline effect). Coefficient estimates in red and green are based on alternative time fixed effects structures 
as explained in the legend. 
 
Overall, the results are very robust to these modifications and confirm the markedly negative 
effects of the PEPP and the smaller effect for the Next Generation EU announcement. In turn, positive 
effects of announcement events are found for reductions of the PSPP and, with less statistical 
precision, for the relaxation of EU fiscal rules. 
The second robustness check addresses a similar concern as the first one; that differences in the 






working-day trends in sovereign spreads that are unrelated to the events (addressed in Figure 3), the 
announcement of a monetary or fiscal policy might have a different effect, depending on the fiscal and 
economic environment in which it is made. A related finding from the literature suggests that the ECB’s 
purchase programs had a significant impact in the beginning when being newly introduced, but less so 
once they were already well established (Urbschat and Watzka 2020). Similarly, the more recent 
announcements to tackle the challenges related to the COVID-19 pandemic might have a stronger 
impact because there is more volatility and uncertainty in the spreads. In line with this view, the 
existing literature identifies a higher effectiveness of central bank asset purchases in environments 
with particularly high sovereign risk (Altavilla et al. 2015). We therefore re-estimate the models and 
shorten the sample period for the monetary policy announcements to align it with the sample period 
for the fiscal policy events and vice versa. 
This assures that our evaluation of the effectiveness of EU monetary vs. fiscal policy is based on 
the same sample period, which levels the playing field. Importantly, a coefficient can only be estimated 
if an announcement concerning a certain policy program was made during the respective sample 
period. For example, there were no interest rate reductions in or after December 2019, such that Panel 
(a) of Figure 4 only contains a coefficient for the longer sample period for this policy instrument. 
As Panel (a) of Figure 4 shows, aligning the underlying sample periods has relatively little impact 
on most coefficient estimates. Surprisingly, however, we estimate very large and statistically significant 
positive effects of (T)LTROs and PSPP expansions when reducing the sample period to the later years. 
This result stands in contrast to findings from the previous literature which documents a negative 
effect of both programs on sovereign spreads (see, e.g., Szczerbowicz (2015) for LTRO effects and 
Altavilla et al. (2015) and Urbschat and Watzka (2020) for effects of the PSPP/APP). However, these 
contributions only use data on policy announcements until mid-2016. Most importantly, the 
robustness check confirms the finding that, among the various instruments, it is the PEPP, which most 
clearly has reduced sovereign spreads. 
To explore whether the unexpected positive effects from PSPP and (T)LTROs is specific for the 
crisis environment of the COVID-19 pandemic, Panel (b) of Figure 4 estimates the effect of (T)LTRO and 
PSPP expansion announcements before 2020 and in 2020 separately. The results confirm the negative 
effect of (T)LTROs and PSPP expansions on government bond spreads prior to 2020, as identified in 
previous contributions. Moreover, they also show that the average positive effect of both programs is 
driven by 2020 announcements. This finding is more in line with Bulligan and Delle Monache (2018) 
who similarly study different time periods for this unconventional monetary policy instrument to 
compare the size of the effect over time. Their sample extends from 2014 to 2017 and suggests the 
strongest negative effect on government bonds in the initial phase of the APP. 
From a market perspective, the fact that the PSPP (and (T)LTRO) announcements had a positive 
effect on sovereign bond spreads in the evolving pandemic is consistent with a view that markets were 
disappointed by these measures. In this regard, the results confirm our hypothesis, that the different 
rules of the PSPP and PEPP should be important (Havlik and Heinemann 2020). For the PSPP, the ECB 
Council is committed to allocating purchases across euro countries according to the ECB capital key. 
Even though the Eurosystem’s actual PSPP purchases have been increasingly diverging from this 






in a particularly critical pandemic situation. These program features provide a possible explanation for 
the striking sign differences for the PSPP and PEPP announcements in 2020. 
 
Figure 4: The role of the considered sample period for the effect of policy announcements 
 
Notes: Coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals for each event type. Results correspond to Equation 
(1) but are based on different sample periods (see legend). For Panel (b) we concentrate on the two monetary 
policy instruments where our results deviate from the existing literature. 
 
As a third and final robustness test, we study the announcement effects for alternative definitions 
of the event windows. We follow the existing literature and consider potential lagged effects of policy 
announcements (e.g., Fendel and Neugebauer 2020) as well as an extended event window of two days 
rather than just taking into account the day of the announcement itself. A number of possible reasons 
could explain the existence of lagged announcement effects. These include: (i) slow market reactions 
(a relevant group among investors are pension funds and insurance companies who might first need 
to get official approval for adjustments to their portfolio), (ii) events taking place later in the day such 
that end-of- the-day courses do not yet fully capture the change in expectations or (iii) a time lag due 
to the delayed dissemination of the announcements via the media which takes some time. 
Figure 5 replicates the previous results based on event dummies equal to 1 on the day of a policy 
announcement and 0 otherwise (baseline effect). In addition to this, the figure plots the coefficient 
estimates when using a lagged event dummy to show market reactions one day after the 
announcement (delayed effect). Finally, it shows the combined effect of the announcement day and 
the day after (2 day event window). Similar to Fendel und Neugebauer (2020), we find slightly stronger 
market reactions for government bonds one day after an announcement for most policy programs. 
This indicates that there is a rather slow reaction of market participants. Overall, the previous 
conclusions are confirmed. Yet, in the more complete picture of Figure 5, the positive coefficient for 
the dummy that captures the relaxation of EU fiscal rules is now larger than in the preceding 






reactions one day after an announcement). Nevertheless, when it comes to our key question of the 
pandemic fiscal and monetary policy measures and their relative importance, the finding of a larger 
importance of the PEPP is even strengthened. For the extended event window of two days, we find a 
larger and statistically highly significant negative effect for the PEPP, associated with an average 
reduction in the spreads of 12.2 basis points (18.0 basis points for the day after the announcement). 
The much smaller effect of Next Generation EU is robust but it does not increase with the extension of 
the event window. 
 
Figure 5: Delayed effects of policy announcements? 
 
Notes: Coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals for each event type. Results correspond to Equation 
(1) (baseline effect). Coefficient estimates in red and green are based on the same model but with a different 
coding of events. First, the event dummy is replaced by a dummy equal to 1 one day after the announcement 
(delayed effect). The second alternative coding uses a two-day event window such that the event dummy is equal 
to 1 for the day of the announcement and the day after. 
 
 
4.3 Extension and by-country analysis 
In this section, we consider two conceptual extensions to the previous analysis by (i) considering the 
effects separately for core vs. periphery countries (Fendel and Neugebauer (2020) identify important 
differences in yield reactions to monetary policy announcements between these two groups of 
countries) and by (ii) analyzing heterogeneous effects with respect to single countries. 
The first extension investigates whether the effect size differs by the fiscal strength of a country. 
As hypothesized above (3.1), countries with a lower borrower reputation are likely to experience a 
larger reduction in sovereign spreads after an expansionary monetary or fiscal support announcement. 
We distinguish fiscally weaker from stronger countries on the basis of their credit ratings. We compare 
the core countries that receive an “Aa” rating (Moody’s) or better (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 






Ireland).11 Figure 6 documents the results. In line with expectations, expansionary policy measures 
correlate in particular with a reduction in government bond spreads for the less solvent countries. The 
coefficients for the PEPP expansions and Next Generation EU announcements are particularly large 
and negative in this group of countries. Somewhat unexpected, a relaxation of EU fiscal rules is a 
particularly unfavorable message for the group of core countries, possibly because they gain more 
fiscal freedom to take on new debt compared to already highly-indebted countries with limited 
capacities to incur much further debt on the market. 
 
Figure 6: Event effects by country groups (core vs. periphery countries) 
 
Notes: Coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals for each event type. Results correspond to Equation 
(1) but show the event effect separately for (i) all 10 countries, (ii) the periphery countries (Spain, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Portugal), and (iii) the core countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, the Netherlands). 
 
As a second and final extension, we consider the announcement effects on the individual 
countries’ spreads (Table 3 to Table 6). They confirm the large empirical relevance of the PEPP, the 
smaller effect of Next Generation EU, and the disinterest of market participants in the smaller 
European fiscal rescue announcements, which do not include a significant transfer component. 
However, the separate country regressions reveal a particularly strong PEPP effect for Italy (16.9 basis 
points) which is more than double of other larger country effect sizes. Next Generation EU had the 
largest effect on Spain (4.1 basis points), Portugal (4.2 basis points), and Greece (5.3 basis points) as 
shown in Table 5. 
                                                          








Table 3: Country-specific effects – PEPP expansion 
  Dependent variable: Government bond spread 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)   (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 Core countries  Periphery countries 
Country Austria Belgium Finland France Netherlands   Spain Greece Ireland Italy Portugal 
PEPP expansion -0.0735** -0.0802** -0.0383*** -0.0787** -0.0290  -0.0602*** 0.0035 -0.0667*** -0.1685*** -0.0713*** 
 (0.0340) (0.0398) (0.0086) (0.0353) (0.0256)  (0.0201) (0.0345) (0.0226) (0.0482) (0.0183) 
            
Constant 0.0143** -0.0015 -0.0006 0.0021 -0.0104*  -0.0001 0.0157 -0.0002 0.0044 0.0023 
  (0.0067) (0.0025) (0.0017) (0.0023) (0.0054)   (0.0055) (0.0177) (0.0030) (0.0137) (0.0062) 
Observations 218 218 218 218 218  218 218 218 218 218 
Adjusted R-squared 0.1430 0.1185 0.0875 0.1520 0.0610  0.0756 0.0527 0.1517 0.0457 0.0894 
Control variables            
Working-day fixed effects            
Notes: OLS regressions. Results correspond to Equation (2). Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
Table 4: Country-specific effects – EU fiscal corona packages 
  Dependent variable: Government bond spread 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)   (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 Core countries  Periphery countries 
Country Austria Belgium Finland France Netherlands   Spain Greece Ireland Italy Portugal 
EU fiscal corona packages -0.0075 -0.0028 0.0241 -0.0017 0.0120  -0.0195 0.0290 0.0022 -0.0616 -0.0268 
 (0.0192) (0.0104) (0.0154) (0.0094) (0.0112)  (0.0168) (0.0389) (0.0153) (0.0399) (0.0209) 
            
Constant 0.0135** -0.0013 -0.0009 0.0017 -0.0100**  -0.0009 0.0103 -0.0009 0.0052 0.0013 
  (0.0061) (0.0023) (0.0017) (0.0022) (0.0050)   (0.0048) (0.0159) (0.0029) (0.0120) (0.0055) 
Observations 240 240 240 240 240  240 240 240 240 240 
Adjusted R-squared 0.1219 0.0327 0.0943 0.0509 0.0592  0.0699 0.0560 0.0868 0.0312 0.0837 
Control variables            
Working-day fixed effects            






Table 5: Country-specific effects – Next Generation EU 
  Dependent variable: Government bond spread 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)   (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 Core countries  Periphery countries 
Country Austria Belgium Finland France Netherlands   Spain Greece Ireland Italy Portugal 
Next Generation EU -0.0093 -0.0128 -0.0014 -0.0098 -0.0004  -0.0407** -0.0534** -0.0098 -0.0872 -0.0417** 
 (0.0091) (0.0105) (0.0055) (0.0081) (0.0082)  (0.0163) (0.0266) (0.0107) (0.0540) (0.0172) 
            
Constant 0.0135** -0.0011 -0.0003 0.0019 -0.0097*  -0.0005 0.0123 -0.0006 0.0056 0.0015 
  (0.0061) (0.0022) (0.0017) (0.0022) (0.0050)   (0.0048) (0.0159) (0.0028) (0.0119) (0.0054) 
Observations 240 240 240 240 240  240 240 240 240 240 
Adjusted R-squared 0.1218 0.0358 0.0458 0.0531 0.0558  0.0750 0.0569 0.0886 0.0316 0.0853 
Control variables            
Working-day fixed effects            
Notes: OLS regressions. Results correspond to Equation (2). Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
Table 6: Country-specific effects – Relaxation of EU fiscal rules 
  Dependent variable: Government bond spread 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)   (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 Core countries  Periphery countries 
Country Austria Belgium Finland France Netherlands   Spain Greece Ireland Italy Portugal 
Relaxation of EU fiscal rules 0.0662*** 0.0368 0.0810*** 0.0130 0.0667***  0.0000 0.1365* 0.0276 -0.0615 -0.0311 
 (0.0070) (0.0241) (0.0115) (0.0162) (0.0065)  (0.0390) (0.0785) (0.0313) (0.0486) (0.0432) 
            
Constant 0.0134** -0.0013 -0.0005 0.0017 -0.0095*  -0.0014 0.0112 -0.0008 0.0035 0.0005 
  (0.0061) (0.0023) (0.0017) (0.0022) (0.0049)   (0.0050) (0.0159) (0.0029) (0.0125) (0.0055) 
Observations 240 240 240 240 240  240 240 240 240 240 
Adjusted R-squared 0.1412 0.0507 0.2098 0.0534 0.0896  0.0659 0.0624 0.0965 0.0249 0.0804 
Control variables            
Working-day fixed effects            







The relaxation of EU fiscal rules exhibits a robust positive effect, in particular for the group of core 
countries. However, the largest coefficient is observed for Greece. To rationalize this finding, one might 
argue that market participants demand a particularly high risk premium on Greek government bonds 
when this highly indebted country faces a reduction in the incentives for fiscal discipline. As the 
coefficient for Greece is only statistically significant at the 10 percent level, this result should, however, 
be interpreted with caution. 
The results for the other event dummies are provided in Table A2 to Table A6 in the Appendix and 
confirm the previous results. 
5 Discussion 
European emergency measures have successfully contributed to shielding euro sovereign markets 
against another downward spiral of rising spreads and increasing market panics. However, our results 
suggest that most of the European fiscal rescue measures, such as activating the provision of liquidity 
from the SURE program, EIB, and ESM, have played no crucial role in this respect. The announcements 
on all jointly analyzed fiscal measures largely passed by without having a measurable impact on the 
risk spreads of periphery euro area countries.  
An exception is the Next Generation EU program, which is associated with a small but significant 
reduction in sovereign spreads of the ten considered euro area countries. However, compared to this 
EU fiscal instrument, the ECB’s announcements on its pandemic emergency measures have been 
associated with much more noticeable and robust coefficients, indicating an instantaneous and 
sizeable spread compression. Measurable monetary policy effects on spreads are largely limited to the 
PEPP, whereas interest rate decisions and longer-term refinancing operations did not trigger any 
noticeable reactions in the relative pricing of sovereign bond market segments over the considered 
period November 2014 to October 2020. The PSPP expansion in early March 2020 even correlates with 
a spread increase signaling a market disappointment. The contrast between the PSPP and the PEPP 
effect emphasizes the particular relevance of the latter with its relaxation of purchase constraints 
including the suspension of the capital key orientation and the end to any issue and issuer limits. 
Fiscal announcements on a temporary relaxation of European fiscal rules through the activation 
of the emergency-escape clause under the Stability and Growth Pact do not contribute to a more 
optimistic outlook on fiscal sustainability. If anything, these announcements are taken as bad news 
and are associated with rising spreads. However, this effect is only statistically significant for the more 
solvent countries or an extended event window of two days. 
Our key result that the pandemic monetary emergency measures through the PEPP have been 
highly effective, whereas fiscal rescue announcements had much less impact (small and statistically 
significant effect for Next Generation EU, no effect for the combination of all fiscal packages), survives 
various robustness checks that allow for various definitions of the event window, lengths of sample 
periods, different types of time fixed effects and country-specific regressions. Thus, in light of our 
analysis, the ECB and the Eurosystem’s emergency measures have played the crucial role in 
guaranteeing the stability of euro area sovereign bond markets in the deepest post-war recession with 






Overall, our results have an unpleasant implication for the debate on a looming fiscal dominance 
of the ECB in the presence of rising public debt levels. So far, the stabilization of sovereign bond 
markets appears to hinge largely on the Eurosystem’s role as a massive buyer of high-debt countries’ 
sovereign bonds. Moreover, our differentiated fiscal policy results indicate which type of fiscal 
instrument has the largest potential to relieve the ECB in future crises. Whereas the loan-based 
instruments like SURE and EIB facilities did not affect the spreads at all, Next Generation EU with its 
transfer component exerted a small, but robust effect. Hence, from the perspective of sovereign bond 
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Box 1: The Eurosystem’s non-standard monetary policy measures 
LTROs / TLTROs / PELTROs: Longer-term refinancing operations (LTROs) are measures by the ECB to 
provide additional liquidity to the euro area money markets with a longer maturity than the usual 
three months. The first time that the ECB provided LTROs with a longer maturity was in March 2008 
with six month LTROs. In May 2009, twelvemonth LTROs followed and in December 2011, three-year 
LTROs were introduced (Fratzscher et al. 2016). Targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTROs) 
were introduced in June 2014 and borrowing was linked to the banks’ loans to non-financial 
corporations and households. Further series, TLTRO II and III, were announced in March 2016 and 
March 2019, respectively (ECB 2021). Finally, in April 2020, the ECB announced pandemic emergency 
longer-term refinancing operations (PELTROs), which would start in May 2020 (ECB 2020b). 
SMP: Central bank purchases of sovereigns in the euro area started with the Securities Market 
Program (SMP) established in May 2010 as a crisis instrument in the evolving euro area debt 
crisis. At this time, the euro area sovereign bond markets suffered from a lack of market liquidity 
for the fiscally fragile Member States with a dramatic widening of spreads. The holdings of the 
Eurosystem under the SMP reached a maximum of €218 billion in September 2012 (Koetter et al. 
2017). The SMP was highly selective as the purchases only included the countries most affected 
by the debt crisis: Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal, and Ireland. 
OMT: Since September 2012, the Outright Monetary Transaction (OMT) program offers support for 
euro area countries that have an agreement with the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). With the 
establishment of the OMT program, the SMP was terminated. As for the SMP, the ECB Council justified 
the new program with the aim of safeguarding an appropriate monetary policy transmission and a 
uniform effectiveness of its monetary policy in all parts of the euro area. So far, the OMT has never 
been activated and has played no role as an option in the pandemic since 2020. 
PSPP: The Public Sector Purchase Program (PSPP) started in March 2015 as the most important 
component of the Asset Purchase Program (APP) and continues until this day, with the exception of a 
pause in net purchases between January and October 2019. By the end of November 2020, the 
cumulated PSPP net purchases of the Eurosystem reached €2,445 billion (of which €2,189 billion are 
national debt and €256 billion supranational). With the PSPP, the Eurozone central banks purchase 
bonds from all euro members with the exception of Greece. APP net purchases currently amount to 
€20 billion per month plus purchases from an additional coronavirus crisis-related envelope of €120 
billion. PSPP net purchases between September and November amounted to €21.2 billion a month 
(ECB 2015). 
PEPP: With the Pandemic Emergency Purchase Program (PEPP), the Governing Council has added a 
second purchase program that complements the ongoing APP (ECB 2020a). PEPP is an asset purchase 
program of private and public sector securities. Compared to the PSPP, the PEPP has relaxed or fully 
abandoned various rules such as issue and issuer limits and the strict orientation of country allocations 






until the end of 2020. However, the ECB Council increased the envelope further in two steps in June 
and December 2020 to €1,850 billion and extended the horizon for net purchases until at least March 
2022. As in the APP, purchases of government bonds are by far the most important item in the PEPP. 
Under the PEPP, Eurosystem central banks buy bonds from all euro members including Greece. By the 
end of November 2020, the Eurosystem PEPP holdings of public sector securities amounted to €652 
billion, which is 93% of all PEPP purchases. Between September and November 2020, the average 
monthly PEPP net purchases of public securities reached €67.9 billion. 
 
 
Box 2: EU fiscal responses to the COVID-19 crisis 
European Fiscal Framework Flexibility: On March 13, 2020, the Commission announced its proposal 
to the European Parliament to activate the general escape clause within the Stability and Growth Pact. 
The European Parliament then actually proposed it on March 20, 2020. This clause allows the EU 
Member States to temporarily deviate from their medium-term budgetary objectives and to fulfil the 
requirements of the excessive deficit procedure at a later point in time, in case they are in the 
procedure. This flexibility allows the Member States to implement necessary measures such as 
stimulus packages in their countries to reduce the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic 
(European Commission 2020b; Delivorias 2020). 
Mobilizing the EU budget: Equally announced on March 13, 2020 was a guarantee of EUR 1 billion 
from the EU budget to the European Investment Fund (EIF) in order to help small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs) and small mid-caps with EUR 8 billion of financing (European Commission 2020b). 
Coronavirus Response Investment Initiative: This initiative, likewise announced on March 13, 2020, 
provides EUR 37 billion to be spent immediately on healthcare, SMEs, and short time work schemes. 
This money has not yet been spent under the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) 2014-20 
Cohesion policy. Moreover, the EU Solidarity Fund was announced to be extended to include health 
aspects. In this fund, EUR 800 million are available in 2020 (European Commission 2020c). 
SURE: The instrument Support to mitigate Unemployment Risks in an Emergency (SURE) was 
launched to support Member States in their effort to protect jobs by funding short-time work schemes 
and similar measures in the form of loans of up to EUR 100 billion in total. The basis of SURE are 
voluntary guarantees of the Member States, depending on their respective relative share of the EU’s 
gross national income (GNI) (European Commission 2020d). In addition to this, the EU is issuing social 
bonds to finance SURE (European Commission 2020e). SURE was announced on April 1, 2020. It was 
agreed upon on April 9, 2020 as part of the EUR 540 billion rescue package (see below). 
EUR 540 billion rescue package: On April 9, 2020 the EU Finance ministers decided on a large rescue 
package with a volume of EUR 540 billion. It contains EUR 240 billion, made available under the ESM, 
a EUR 25 billion guarantee fund that shall mobilize EUR 200 billion for SMEs by the European 
Investment Bank (EIB) and EUR 100 billion for SURE (Sandford 2020). All components are based on 






French-German Initiative for the European Recovery from the coronavirus crisis: On May 18, 2020 
France and Germany made a joint proposal for different policy measures. It included a Recovery Fund 
of EUR 500 billion within the MFF 2021-27. This fund was proposed to provide additional EU budgetary 
expenditure for the sectors which are severely hit by the crisis. The proposal included the possibility 
for the EU to borrow on markets (German Federal Government 2020). It was the foundation of Next 
Generation EU (see below). 
Next Generation EU: On May 27, 2020 the Commission proposed a new recovery plan – Next 
Generation EU. EUR 750 billion would be added to the MFF 2021-27. The plan consists of three pillars: 
(i) support for Member States with investments and reforms, i.e., a recovery and resilience facility, 
additional cohesion and agricultural spending and funds to support the transition to climate neutrality; 
(ii) incentives for private investments; (iii) measures preparing for future crises including a health 
program, a civil protection program, research in health, resilience, green and digital transformations 
and support for global partners. To finance the recovery plan, the own resources ceiling will be 
temporarily increased to 2% of the EU’s GNI to be able to borrow the EUR 750 billion on financial 
markets. On July 21, 2020 the European Council agreed on Next Generation EU costing EUR 750 billion 
and the MFF 2021-27, which both amount to EUR 1.8 trillion. The EUR 750 billion are divided into EUR 
390 billion to be paid out as grants and EUR 360 billion in the form of loans. The repayment is scheduled 
until the end of 2058 (European Commission 2020f; European Council 2020). The Commission’s 
program was based on a French-German proposal for an EU recovery plan, published on May 18, 2020. 
The Commission proposal was discussed during a special European Council from July 17 to July 21, 
























Table A1: Summary statistics 




Panel sample 15.650 1,3129 1,9318 0,0324 18,5483  
∆yt 
Ten-year government bond yield 
spread against German bond 
(3rd-order polynomial yield 
curve, first difference) 
15.650 -0,0006 0,0911 -5,4185 3,3286 
 
∆yt-1 One day lag of ∆𝛥𝛥𝑡𝑡 15.650 -0,0006 0,0912 -5,4185 3,3286  
∆CESIt Citi Bank Economic Surprise Index 15.650 0,0866 8,2635 
-
170,3000 89,9000  
∆Corp_spreadt 
Corporate bond spread 
(difference between BBB and 
AAA rated corporate bonds) 
15.650 0,0002 0,0194 -0,2070 0,1560 
 
        
Single countries samples       
∆yt,AT ∆yt for Austria 1.565 0,0000 0,0232 -0,1693 0,1656 GVOE03(CM10) 
∆yt,BE ∆yt for Belgium 1.565 -0,0001 0,0186 -0,1542 0,1484 GVBG03(CM10) 
∆yt,FI ∆yt for Finland 1.565 0,0000 0,0130 -0,1132 0,1357 GVFN03(CM10) 
∆yt,FR ∆yt for France 1.565 0,0000 0,0186 -0,2305 0,1603 GVFR03(CM10) 
∆yt,NL ∆yt for Netherlands 1.565 -0,0001 0,0182 -0,0852 0,1248 GVNL03(CM10) 
∆yt,ES ∆yt for Spain 1.565 -0,0003 0,0441 -0,3788 0,3264 GVES03(CM10) 
∆yt,GR ∆yt for Greece 1.565 -0,0036 0,2642 -5,4185 3,3286 GVGR03(CM10) 
∆yt,IE ∆yt for Ireland 1.565 -0,0005 0,0267 -0,1745 0,2031 GVIR03(CM10) 
∆yt,IT ∆yt for Italy 1.565 -0,0001 0,0701 -0,7314 0,6156 GVIL03(CM10) 
∆yt,PT ∆yt for Portugal 1.565 -0,0013 0,0631 -0,4406 0,4436 GVPT03(CM10) 
        
∆yt-1,AT ∆yt-1 for Austria 1.565 0,0000 0,0232 -0,1693 0,1656  
∆yt-1,BE ∆yt-1 for Belgium 1.565 -0,0001 0,0186 -0,1542 0,1484  
∆yt-1,FI ∆yt-1 for Finland 1.565 0,0000 0,0130 -0,1132 0,1357  
∆yt-1,FR ∆yt-1 for France 1.565 0,0000 0,0186 -0,2305 0,1603  
∆yt-1,NL ∆yt-1 for Netherlands 1.565 -0,0001 0,0182 -0,0852 0,1248  
∆yt-1,ES ∆yt-1 for Spain 1.565 -0,0004 0,0441 -0,3788 0,3264  
∆yt-1,GR ∆yt-1 for Greece 1.565 -0,0035 0,2643 -5,4185 3,3286  
∆yt-1,IE ∆yt-1 for Ireland 1.565 -0,0005 0,0267 -0,1745 0,2031  
∆yt-1,IT ∆yt-1 for Italy 1.565 -0,0002 0,0701 -0,7314 0,6156  
∆yt-1,PT ∆yt-1 for Portugal 1.565 -0,0013 0,0632 -0,4406 0,4436   








Table A2: Country-specific effects – Interest rate decrease 
  Dependent variable: Government bond spread 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)   (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 Core countries  Periphery countries 
Country Austria Belgium Finland France Netherlands   Spain Greece Ireland Italy Portugal 
Interest rate decrease -0.0013 -0.0020 -0.0104* -0.0032 -0.0196  0.0054 -0.0146 0.0019 -0.0179 -0.0009 
 (0.0123) (0.0116) (0.0061) (0.0194) (0.0176)  (0.0298) (0.0467) (0.0044) (0.0445) (0.0250) 
            
Constant 0.0017 0.0008 -0.0002 0.0022* -0.0020**  -0.0020 0.0299* -0.0023 0.0009 -0.0025 
  (0.0013) (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0012) (0.0010)   (0.0028) (0.0174) (0.0016) (0.0041) (0.0040) 
Observations 1,565 1,565 1,565 1,565 1,565  1,565 1,565 1,565 1,565 1,565 
Adjusted R-squared 0.1011 0.0439 0.0344 0.0487 0.0637  0.0568 0.0478 0.0465 0.0431 0.0747 
Control variables            
Working-day fixed effects            
Notes: OLS regressions. Results correspond to Equation (2). Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
Table A3: Country-specific effects – (T)LTRO 
  Dependent variable: Government bond spread 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)   (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 Core countries  Periphery countries 
  Austria Belgium Finland France Netherlands   Spain Greece Ireland Italy Portugal 
(T)LTRO 0.0119 0.0261 -0.0030 0.0308 -0.0106  0.0083 -0.0186 0.0078 0.0712 0.0035 
 (0.0118) (0.0229) (0.0069) (0.0252) (0.0193)  (0.0312) (0.0576) (0.0134) (0.0995) (0.0506) 
            
Constant 0.0017 0.0008 -0.0002 0.0022* -0.0020**  -0.0020 0.0299* -0.0023 0.0009 -0.0025 
  (0.0013) (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0012) (0.0010)   (0.0028) (0.0174) (0.0016) (0.0041) (0.0040) 
Observations 1,565 1,565 1,565 1,565 1,565  1,565 1,565 1,565 1,565 1,565 
Adjusted R-squared 0.1021 0.0514 0.0334 0.0590 0.0628  0.0570 0.0478 0.0468 0.0468 0.0747 
Control variables            
Working-day fixed effects            






Table A4: Country-specific effects – PSPP and PEPP expansion 
  Dependent variable: Government bond spread 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)   (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 Core countries  Periphery countries 
  Austria Belgium Finland France Netherlands   Spain Greece Ireland Italy Portugal 
PSPP and PEPP expansion -0.0131 -0.0073 -0.0177*** -0.0029 -0.0299**  -0.0021 -0.0412 -0.0111 0.0136 -0.0077 
 (0.0199) (0.0276) (0.0056) (0.0294) (0.0132)  (0.0302) (0.0485) (0.0188) (0.0950) (0.0466) 
            
Constant 0.0017 0.0008 -0.0002 0.0022* -0.0020**  -0.0020 0.0299* -0.0023 0.0009 -0.0025 
  (0.0013) (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0012) (0.0010)   (0.0028) (0.0174) (0.0016) (0.0041) (0.0040) 
Observations 1,565 1,565 1,565 1,565 1,565  1,565 1,565 1,565 1,565 1,565 
Adjusted R-squared 0.1025 0.0446 0.0413 0.0488 0.0734  0.0568 0.0479 0.0472 0.0431 0.0747 
Control variables            
Working-day fixed effects            
Notes: OLS regressions. Results correspond to Equation (2). Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Table A5: Country-specific effects – PSPP expansion 
  Dependent variable: Government bond spread 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)   (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 Core countries  Periphery countries 
  Austria Belgium Finland France Netherlands   Spain Greece Ireland Italy Portugal 
PSPP expansion 0.0116 0.0217 -0.0094** 0.0273 -0.0320**  0.0190 -0.0453 0.0115 0.0916 0.0181 
 (0.0142) (0.0267) (0.0037) (0.0301) (0.0139)  (0.0385) (0.0642) (0.0152) (0.1154) (0.0611) 
            
Constant 0.0017 0.0008 -0.0002 0.0022* -0.0020**  -0.0020 0.0299* -0.0023 0.0009 -0.0025 
  (0.0013) (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0012) (0.0010)   (0.0028) (0.0174) (0.0016) (0.0041) (0.0040) 
Observations 1,565 1,565 1,565 1,565 1,565  1,565 1,565 1,565 1,565 1,565 
Adjusted R-squared 0.1019 0.0482 0.0348 0.0555 0.0713  0.0574 0.0478 0.0471 0.0483 0.0749 
Control variables            
Working-day fixed effects            







Table A6: Country-specific effects – PSPP reduction 
  Dependent variable: Government bond spread 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)   (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 Core countries  Periphery countries 
Country Austria Belgium Finland France Netherlands   Spain Greece Ireland Italy Portugal 
PSPP reduction -0.0053 0.0033 0.0056 0.0060 0.0159  0.0012 0.0629** 0.0253 0.0113 0.0735 
 (0.0218) (0.0156) (0.0094) (0.0175) (0.0138)  (0.0260) (0.0320) (0.0161) (0.0309) (0.0507) 
            
Constant 0.0017 0.0008 -0.0002 0.0022* -0.0020**  -0.0020 0.0299* -0.0023 0.0009 -0.0042 
  (0.0013) (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0012) (0.0010)   (0.0028) (0.0174) (0.0016) (0.0041) (0.0040) 
Observations 1,565 1,565 1,565 1,565 1,565  1,565 1,565 1,565 1,565 1,565 
Adjusted R-squared 0.1012 0.0440 0.0335 0.0489 0.0630  0.0568 0.0479 0.0482 0.0430 0.0772 
Control variables            
Working-day fixed effects            
Notes: OLS regressions. Results correspond to Equation (2). Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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